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This paper summarizes the principal reform 
commitments that Russia has undertaken as part 
of its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession 
negotiations, providing detailed assessments in banking, 
insurance, and agriculture. The paper assesses the gains 
to the Russian economy from these commitments, based 
on a summary of several modeling efforts undertaken 
by the author and his colleagues. The author compares 
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Russian commitments with those of other countries that 
have recently acceded to the WTO to assess the claim 
that the demands on Russia are excessive due to political 
considerations. He explains why Russian WTO accession 
will result in the elimination of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment against Russia. Finally, he discusses the 
remaining issues in the negotiations and the time frame 
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As of May 2007, there are 150 member countries of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Trade among them represented 97 percent of the world's trade 
turnover, including over 94 percent of the foodstuffs. Russia is the largest economy 
outside the WTO and—along with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—is among the 29 
countries that were attempting to accede to the WTO in early 2007.  
 
  The Working Party on accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO was 
established June 16, 1993.. The WTO Working Party on Russia’s accession comprises 60 
countries (with the addition of two new WTO members, Vietnam and Cambodia), and is 
the largest such Working Party in the history of the WTO . By March 2006, the Working 
Party had met 30 times. By the spring of 2007, Russia has successfully concluded 
bilateral agreements with all but the two new members of its Working Party and 
Georgia.
2  The focus now is on the multilateral phase of the negotiations, where the 
parties indicate a lot of work remains to be done as of the spring of 2007.  
 
In the paper, I address several issues regarding Russian WTO accession. In 
section II, I explain what Russia will get from WTO accession. In section III, I 
summarize the principal Russian reform commitments at the WTO. In section IV, I 
address the question of whether the demands on Russia are excessive due to political 
considerations. In section V, I explain why Russian WTO accession will result in the 
elimination of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment against Russia. In the final section, I 
discuss remaining issues in the negotiations and the time frame for Russian accession.  
 
 
II. WTO Accession for Russia: A Crucial Historical Opportunity 
 
WTO accession is a process that may be used as an important tool for economic 
development. WTO accession will impact on a wide range of policies and institutions, 
including tariff policy, customs administration, standards, rights of foreign investors 
(especially in services), agricultural policy, intellectual property and possibly government 
procurement. It therefore represents a time for evaluation of a very wide range of 
regulation and an opportunity to implement important trade, foreign direct investment 
                                                 
2 No significant problems are anticipated that would prevent agreements with Cambodia or Vietnam. 
Georgia earlier had agreed to a bilateral agreement on Russian WTO accession but has withdrawn from that 
agreement due to a deep dispute discussed below.  
  2and institutional changes. These changes can move the economy toward an open trade 
and investment model of economic development and away from an import-substitution 
economic model. 
 
  My colleagues and I have undertaken several detailed numerical studies to assess 
the consequences of WTO accession in Russia. (See Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr, 2006, 
2007; Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo, 2005; and Rutherford and Tarr, 2006, 
forthcoming.)
3  We have assessed the likely impacts on overall income, wages, returns to 
capital, poverty, output, exports, imports and employment by sector, and how impacts 
will differ across the regions of Russia. The basic macroeconomic impacts are presented 
in table 1.What I would like to emphasize is that these studies indicate that Russia will 
reap substantial gains from WTO accession, the benefits are widespread and will reduce 
poverty, those regions that establish a better investment climate will reap greater gains 
from WTO accession, and, crucially, most of the gains are due to Russia’s own reforms. 
The reforms in the services sectors, are the most important of Russia’s own reforms. 
 
Although governments typically try to sell WTO accession to the general public 
as a process that will yield increased market access for their own exporters, our estimates 
are that less than 10 percent of the gains come from improved market access for Russian 
exporters. After all, Russia has negotiated most favored nation status or better with all its 
significant trading partners. While Russian exporters will be accorded additional legal 
benefits in antidumping cases once Russia is a WTO member, and this is the source of 
the gains we estimate, many economists are cynical regarding the fairness of antidumping 
proceedings. This suggests that we should not expect very significant differences in 
determinations against Russian exporters in antidumping cases, and consequently 
improved market access in export markets cannot be the source of significant gains to 
Russia from WTO accession.
4 
 
  Given that the benefits to Russia of WTO accession come from its own internal 
reforms, some infer from this fact that Russia will gain little from WTO accession—since 
Russia could unilaterally implement these reforms. There are several reasons why I take 
the opposite view—that the process of WTO accession is a unique historical opportunity 
to achieve reform.  
 
                                                 
3 Versions of all these studies are available at www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto. This work follows my 
earlier studies examining Russian trade policy. See Tarr (1993, 1994, 1999, 2002) and Michalopoulos and 
Tarr (1994, 1996, 1997).  
4 In addition, members of the WTO obtain rights in international trade. Members are granted permanent 
most-favored nation status to the markets of other member states. So Russia will not have to be concerned 
about  annual renewals of Most Favored Nation status. Members are also able to use the WTO’s dispute 
settlement procedures to protect their trade interests, such as in antidumping cases.  Trade disputes among 
WTO members are resolved based on WTO legal agreements under which smaller countries have the 
potential to win disputes against large countries. All WTO agreements require unanimous consent of all the 
members, and this helps provide a voice for the smaller member countries. On the other hand, non-
members will be influenced by the new rules of this dominant organization in international trade, without a 
voice in their formation.  
  3The key reason that WTO is important is the political economy dimension. Given 
the concentrated benefits to industries that achieve protection, industry groups will 
typically lobby for protection. On the other hand, since the benefits to consumers are 
diverse and less concentrated, they typically do not lobby against protection, but hope 
others with similar interests will lobby on their behalf. This so called “free rider problem” 
in political decision-making results in an absence of representation of the views of the 
consumer and broader economic interests in political discussions of tariffs. Lobbying and 
political economy considerations often allow special interests to strongly influence policy 
so that reforms are slow. WTO accession, however, requires across the board reform in 
many sectors, and the pressure of a WTO negotiation engages policy makers at the 
highest levels of government. Experience has shown that high- level policy-makers, who 
have the economy-wide interest in mind, will often intervene to impose reform on slow 
moving Ministries. In the case of Russia, the process began to move when Putin made 
WTO accession a priority in his first term.  
 
In section III, I summarize many of the key reforms that Russia has made. It is 
difficult to argue that Russia would have made reforms as widespread and as deep as it 
has without the external pressure of WTO accession.  Reforms are accomplished in the 
context of WTO accession that would not normally be achieved so quickly. That is, WTO 
bindings and external pressure make it easier for a government to adopt a trade policy 
designed to promote growth and poverty reduction. Moreover, unlike unilateral reforms, 
once a country commits to a reform at the WTO, it is bound by an international 
commitment that is difficult to reverse in the future by a less reform mined government. I 
conclude that the process of negotiating bilateral market access with the countries on its 
WTO Working Party on Accession, has led to a dramatic increase in reforms regarding 
the Russian trade and foreign investment regimes, and thereby has helped Russia move 
toward an open economy model of economic development.  
 
 
III. Russian Commitments to Foreign Exporters and Investors
5 
 
Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) 
 
  Overall Tariffs. Russia agreed to reduce its bound MFN tariffs to about 8 percent 
on average. How does this compare to recent levels of tariffs in Russia? Russia’s tariff 
schedule contains over 11,000 tariff lines. On about 1,700 of these, the tariff is written as:  
“x percent, but not less than y euros.” That is, a specific tariff of y euros per unit applies 
if the specific tariff exceeds the ad valorem tariff.  This amounts to applying the 
maximum of either the specific or ad valorem tariff. Previous calculations of Russia’s 
tariffs have either inappropriately ignored the specific tariffs that often apply or have 
                                                 
5 The United States Trade Representative (2006) has released five “Fact Sheets” with details of Russian 
commitments as part the US-Russia bilateral protocol. See this source for further details. 
 




Recently, however, Oleksandr Shepotylo and I (see, Shepotylo and Tarr, 
forthcoming) have obtained data that allowed us to calculate the actual Russian tariffs. 
Briefly, our key results are the following. The average tariff in Russia has increased 
between 2001 and 2003 from about 11.5 percent to between 13 and 14.5 percent, but it 
has held steady in 2004 and 2005. This places Russia’s tariffs at a level slightly higher 
than other middle-income countries and considerably higher than the OECD countries. 
The tariff structure became much more diverse between 2001 and 2003, but the 
dispersion of the tariff moderated in 2004 and 2005. Notably the trade weighted standard 
deviation of the tariff approximately doubled from 9.5 percent in 2001 to 18 percent in 
2003, but then fell to 15.2 percent by 2005 . “Tariff peaks,” that is, tariff lines with very 
high tariffs, are more of a problem in 2005 than in 2001, but less so than in 2003. The 
reason for the increase in the tariffs is the specific tariffs, as the ad valorem rates have not 
increased. More tariff lines are subject to specific tariffs in 2003-2005 than in 2001, and 
the appreciation of the euro, relative to 2001 has increased the ad valorem equivalent of 
the specific tariffs. The food sector and light industry are the aggregate sectors with the 
highest tariff rates—their tariff rates in 2005 were 23.1 percent and 19.5 percent on a 
trade-weighted basis. At the two digit level, motor vehicles, footwear, leather products 
and sugar are among the most highly protected. 
 
Our aggregate results are summarized in table 1. For the most recent year, 
Russia’s MFN tariffs were about 12.1 percent on a simple average basis or 14 percent on 
a trade weighted basis in 2005, where we have taken into account the ad valorem 
equivalents of Russia’s specific tariffs. We find that ignoring the specific tariffs results in 
a reduction in the calculated average tariff to about 11 percent. Independent of how the 
members of the Working Party have calculated Russian tariffs, an average Russian tariff 
of the 8 percent implies a decline. 
 
  Civil Aircraft and Capital Goods and Equipment. One of the more contentious 
areas of tariff negotiation was civil aircraft. Tariffs on wide body aircraft will be reduced 
from 20 to 7.5 percent in the four years following accession. Russia has agreed to 
substantial tariff reductions in construction, agricultural and scientific equipment, as well 





  Some of the most important and internally controversial commitments by Russia 
are in the area of services.  
 
Insurance. Russia will significantly increase its commitments to multinational 
insurance providers. It will allow 100 percent foreign ownership of non-life insurance 
                                                 
6 The annual report of the Russian Customs Service publishes trade data for about 1600 tariff categories. 
There are over 11,000. tariff lines, so the Customs Service aggregates many tariff lines in this publication.  
  5companies upon accession to the WTO. Russian prohibition of foreign participation in 
mandatory insurance lines as well as Russian restraints on the number of licenses granted 
to foreign life insurance firms will be phased out five years after the date of accession. 
Russian had restrained the amount of foreign investment in the sector to be about 15 
percent of total investment; but as part of its accession commitments, Russia agreed to 
increase this limit to 50 percent.  
 
  The Russian banking and insurance sectors see themselves as very vulnerable to 
much more powerful and efficient multinational providers of financial services. As such 
they were strong opponents of commitments in these sectors. The insurance sector was 
reportedly very concerned by the level of commitments made by their government in the 
rush to get an agreement prior to the G-8 conference in Saint Petersburg in late spring 
2006.  The experience of China, where similar fears were expressed by insurance 
interests, is instructive and suggests that these fears are exaggerated.  Prior to 2001, 
China had a very closed insurance market. As part of its WTO accession commitments, 
China agreed to gradually remove restrictions on foreign investors in insurance and fully 
open its insurance markets by January 2005 (except foreign companies could hold a 
maximum of 50 percent in the life insurance market; (see Mattoo (2003, p. 312).  As 
expected the results have been extremely positive for consumers of insurance services in 
China. In addition, wages of skilled workers in the insurance sector have grown, and even 
domestic insurance companies have grown, due to better access to foreign capital as 
foreign investors, with only one exception, have sought and obtained local partners.
7. 
 
                                                 
7   The key developments in the insurance sector since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 are: (i) 
very strong growth of both domestic Chinese and foreign insurance companies operating in China; (ii) 
continued dominance of the market by Chinese companies; (iii) large increase in employment of skilled 
workers in the sector; (iv) entry by foreigners through either joint ventures or strategic investment in 
Chinese companies; and (v) acquisition of foreign capital by Chinese companies through strategic 
partnerships.. Total premiums have more than doubled between 2001 and 2005. During this time, the total 
number of insurance companies has increased from 41 to 78, and the number of Chinese companies 
increased from 20 to 41. (Facts on the Chinese insurance market for this note are taken from primarily from 
Ewing (2006) and supplemented from Datamonitor (2005).) 
 
The largest insurance market in China is life insurance, which captures about two-thirds of the 
total insurance premiums in China.  The life insurance industry in China has more than doubled from 2001 
to 2005, and forecasts are for continued growth in the market that will likely double the size of the market 
by 2010.  Life insurance premiums increased from 140 billion yuan ($17.5 billion) in 2001 to 365 billion 
yuan ($45.4 billion) in 2005. Demand for actuaries, underwriters and managers has soared, e.g., the 
industry added 500,000 new agents to bring the total to 1.5 million.  The life insurance market remains 
dominated by domestic companies, especially three large domestic Chinese companies:  The domestic 
share of the market was 91 percent in 2005, down from 97.5 percent in 2004. Most of the domestic life 
insurance companies have taken on a strategic foreign investor (like HSBC, Zurich Financial Services, 
Meiji Life Insurance and the Carlyle Group), as these investors now own minority shares of the companies, 
with shares ranging from 1 percent to 25 percent.  In 2006 there were 22 foreign life insurance companies 
operating in China, but 21 of these were joint ventures with Chinese companies.  Thus, there is a very 
strong pattern among foreign life insurance companies to either form a joint venture with a Chinese 
company or else to purchase a minority strategic interest in a Chinese run company. Only American 
International Group sells life insurance in China independently of a Chinese partner.  
 
  6Banking and Securities.  Russia has agreed to bind most existing market access 
arrangements and to offer some additional liberalization. These commitments include: 
allowing 100 percent foreign ownership of banks and other non-insurance financial 
institutions; allowing cross border provision of numerous services including asset 
management services, credit cards and other types of payments; allowing foreign 
investment companies to own and trade the full range of securities available in Russia, 
including state securities and bullion, and to participate in the financing of privatization 
of state owned enterprises.  In addition, Russian restraints on the share of the sector 
captured by foreign banks will increase from about 15 percent of total investment to 50 
percent. 
 
  In banking, opposition galvanized around the branch banking issue. Russia was 
willing to allow subsidiaries of international banks.  Subsidiaries must be registered as 
Russian entities, have their own capital and are subject to supervision by the Russian 
central bank.  Branches, however, do not have a separate legal status or capital apart from 
their foreign parent bank.  In general, entry into banking services in a country is easier 
when branches are permitted and the U.S. Treasury has been attempting to assure branch 
banking is permitted in all countries admitted to the WTO.  The Russian central bank 
maintained that it could not regulate or supervise branches adequately and that depositors 
would therefore be at risk.  
 
The counterargument to the view of the Russian central bank is that theory 
suggests and experience has shown that multinational banks have more of their reputation 
on the line with a branch, and this will provide greater incentive to avoid default. 
Moreover, to the extent that the costs of entry through branches are smaller, the number 
of multinationals present will be larger with branches. Then the host country has the 
advantage of a larger amount of FDI if it allows branches. This is the greatest advantage 
of allowing branch banking, but it was also the greatest concern of the central bank of 
Russia--since it implies greater potential adjustment costs for Russian banks.  
 
Of the 150 countries in the World Bank database on "Banking Regulation and 
Supervision" for  2003,
8 branch banking was prohibited in only 18. The 18 countries 
prohibiting branch banking were: Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Ukraine 
from the CIS plus Bolivia, Botswana, Columbia, Costa Rica, Macedonia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Papa New Guinea, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Trinidad and 
Tabago and Zimbabwe. The remaining 132 countries, including all OECD and EU (25) 
countries allow branch banking. 
 
It seemed that the Chinese approach offered a reasonable compromise. China 
allows branches, but China imposes a large minimum asset requirement on the parent 
bank.
9 The de facto consequence of this is that China only allows rather large 
multinational banks to enter. This both protects incumbent Chinese banks against many 
                                                 
8 See http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/bank_regulation.htm. Rows 31, 32 and 42 
provide data on branch banking.  
9 This minimum asset requirement would have to be scheduled in the GATS commitments in order to avoid 
disputes with members.  
  7new entrants, but also means that the foreign entrants are likely to be relatively safe and 
in need of little supervision or regulation 
 
Banking interests in Russia succeeded in getting Putin himself to say that branch 
banking was a deal breaker for Russian WTO accession.  Based on its bilateral agreement 
with the U.S., Russia succeeded in avoiding a commitment on branch banking, becoming 
the only non-LDC acceding country to avoid such a commitment.
10  Like many items in 
accession negotiations, succeeding in avoiding a commitment is a pyrrhic victory as 
Russia will lose the benefits from greater foreign direct investment. Nonetheless, 
multinational banks, operating as subsidiaries, have greater market access and national 
treatment rights under the bilateral U.S.-Russia agreement and Russia should benefit 
from greater involvement of multinational banks in Russia over time .  
 
Telecommunications.  As part of its bilateral agreement with the European  
Union, Russia agreed to terminate the monopoly of Rostelekom on fixed line long 
distance telephone services. In the agreement with the U.S., Russia committed to allow 
100 percent foreign owned telecommunications companies to operate in any 
telecommunications sector. Russia also agreed to implement the WTO Basic 
Telecommunications Reference Paper, which among other reforms will require Russia to 
establish an independent regulator and provide for transparency and interconnection 
obligations. Presently the Ministry of Communications is responsible for managing any 
state assets as well as performing regulatory functions such as interconnection and 
licensing. Conflicts of interest are more likely when the same government entity that 
manages the state assets is also responsible for the regulatory functions,
11 and it is likely 
that a commitment to an independent regulator and other key reforms in the sector would 
not have been achieved without international pressure 
  
  Business Services. Russia will ensure market access and national treatment for a 
wide variety of professions, including lawyers, architects, accountants, engineers, health 
care professionals, advertising, marketing and management specialists. Foreign 
companies will be permitted to operate as 100 percent foreign owned entitites.   
 
  Distribution Services.  Russia will allow 100 percent foreign owned companies 
to engage in wholesale, retail and franchise sectors, as well as express delivery services  





  Agricultural issues have been among the most contentious in Russia’s WTO 
accession negotiations. The key unresolved issue is agricultural subsidies. Russia, 
                                                 
10 Russia agrees to reopen discussions on this issue upon consideration of membership in the OECD.  
11 As a result of proceedings in a Swiss arbitration court, questions have arisen of indirect financial links 
between the Russian Minister of Communications and Megafon, the country’s third largest mobile 
telephone provider. No links have been proven, however. See Oleg Dorman, “Communication Minister 
Reiman Admits his Connection to Megafon,” Moscow News, April 5, 2007. 
  8however, has made considerable commitments in market access as well as sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary negotiations. For beef, pork and poultry exports, the disputes with the U.S. 
were among the most significant. The bilateral agreement with the U.S. details the 
following commitments. 
  
  Market Access. Russia agreed to bind its tariffs on all agricultural products. It 
many cases this entailed tariff cuts from present levels. See U.S. Trade Representative 
(2006) for details.  
 
  Non-Tariff Barriers.  Regarding poultry and pork products, instead of joint 
inspection of facilities, Russia agrees to allow the U.S. Department of Agriculture-Food 
Safety and Inspection Service to inspect and certify new facilities or facilities that need to 
remedy a deficiency.  Regarding beef, Russia and the U.S. agree to timely joint 
inspections of all facilities that will export to the Russia. Once a joint inspection has been 
completed, the inspection process applying to poultry and pork exporters will apply.  
 
  Regarding trichinae in pork, Russia will allow freezing as mitigation of the risk on 
sales destined to Russian consumers. Previously, Russia only allowed this for 
intermediate pork sales. The Russian regulatory regime in modern biotechnology 
products has been unpredictable. For example product registrations and approvals in the 
area of feeds were halted in 2004 when work began on a new permanent regulatory 
system. Russia also agreed to maintain an interim approval and registration system for 
modern biotechnology products (until a permanent one can be established) that is science 
based, transparent and consistent with the WTO Agreement.  
 
IV. Are there Excessive Demands on Russia due to Political Considerations 
 
  The allegation that demands on Russia are either political or excessive by the 
standards of other countries that have acceded to the WTO have been repeated frequently 
and have been come to be believed by many observers. I believe, however, that the 
evidence contradicts this allegation. Aside from a couple of well publicized cases where 
unusual demands were placed on Russia,
12 the demands placed are Russia are typical of 
the WTO accession process in the past ten years. The process of acceding to the WTO 
since 1998 is a difficult one in which all acceding countries have been asked to take on 
very significant commitments to foreign exporters and investors. In comparison with the 
commitments of these countries, the commitments that are reported for Russia do not 
appear excessive.  
 
  Goods. In goods, Russia has agreed to bind its tariffs at an average tariff level of 
8 percent, after an adjustment period (USTR, 2006). This is a slightly higher average 
bound tariff on goods than most countries that have acceded to the WTO since 1998 (see 
WTO, 2005). The average tariffs for other acceding countries are: Saudi Arabia, 10.5 
percent; Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, 6.2 percent; Armenia, 7.5 percent; 
                                                 
12 One unusual demand on Russia was the pressure on Russia to unify its domestic and export price of 
natural gas. This demand, which occupied negotiators for considerable time and was eventually dropped by 
the European Union, would have imposed a very high cost on Russia (see Tarr and Thompson, 2005). 
  9Chinese Taipei, 4.8 percent; China, 9.1 percent; Moldova, 6.0 percent; Croatia, 5.5 
percent; Oman, 11.6 percent; Albania, 6.6 percent; Georgia, 6.5 percent; Jordan, 15.2 
percent; Estonia, 7.3 percent; Latvia, 9.4 percent; Kyrgyz Republic, 6.7 percent.
13 Thus, 
by the standards of countries that have acceded to the WTO in the last eight years that are 
not “Least Developing Countries,” Russia appears to have acceded with bound tariffs 
slightly higher than average, i.e., no excessive demands from the Working Party here.  
 
  Services. In the area of services, no simple measure like an average tariff is 
available. But an examination of the table of commitments of the countries that have 
acceded to the WTO since 1998 (WTO, 2005, table 5) shows that that all of them have 
assumed a rather high and comprehensive level of commitments, in terms of sectors 
included. On a qualitative basis, the more detailed discussion above on banking and 
insurance does not suggest an above average level of commitments in these important 
sectors. On the contrary, Russia has been able to avoid a commitment to branches of 
banks, unlike almost all of these countries. 
 
  Agriculture.  Although trade-distorting subsidies (subsidies that are dependent on 
exports or production) are constrained by the WTO, the WTO allows without any 
constraints publicly funded subsidies to agriculture that are not trade-distorting. These 
types of subsidies are known as “Green Box” subsidies. Green Box subsidies include a 
wide range of publicly funded measures including research and development, pest 
control, general and specialist training, extension and advisory services, inspection 
services for health and sanitary reasons, marketing and promotion services, infrastructure 
services, including electricity, roads and environmental expenditures, targeted support to 
low income population through food stamps or subsidized prices, direct payments to 
producers to support income provided it has minimal trade-distorting features , crop 
insurance subsidies for natural disasters, adjustment assistance through producer 
retirement programs and indirect income support not related to prices. The world-wide 
trend is to move agricultural support away from trade-distorting subsidies toward Green 
Box measures. In part, this is because it is generally recognized that trade-distorting 
subsidies are a highly inefficient way of helping agricultural producers compared with 
Green Box measures. And Green Box measures are more effective at creating a 
competitive agricultural sector in the long run. 
 
Nonetheless, incumbent members of the WTO, like the European Union, Canada, 
the United States and Norway, have a base period for trade-distorting agricultural 
subsidies that allows considerable trade-distorting subsidies. The precedent among 
acceding countries, however, is that the three year period prior to accession forms the 
base period for permitted trade-distorting subsidies, and trade-distorting subsidies are 
negotiated down from that base. Although it is good for the Russian economy, the 
problem for Russian WTO accession negotiators is that in recent years Russia has had a 
rather low level of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies; but Russia would like to retain 
the right to U.S. trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture in the future. This issue was not 
resolved during the bilateral phase of the negotiations and will be one of the most 
                                                 
13 Two of the “Least Developed Nations” acceded with relatively high bound tariffs: Cambodia, 17.7 
percent; and Nepal, 23.7 percent.  But the WTO accords a preferential status to developing countries.  
  10contentious in the multilateral phase. Other countries, like Kazakhstan, who have a 
similar negotiating position, are waiting to see if Russia is successful in its negotiations. 
If Russia is able to obtain the right to provide trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture on 
a new basis among acceding countries, these other countries will demand parallel 
treatment. In any event, it is difficult to argue that Russia is being treated more harshly 
than other countries that have acceded, since it is asking for a departure from precedent. 
 
 
V. Russian WTO Accession and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
 
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment of the U.S. requires an annual review of Russian 
emigration policies in order for the U.S. to grant Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to 
Russia (and other former communist countries).  This is a significant irritant to Russia, 
but the U.S. does not presently have any commercial pressure on it to remove Jackson-
Vanik. Once Russia becomes a WTO member, however, there will be commercial 
pressure on the U.S. from its own exporters and investors to remove Jackson-Vanik. 
Consequently, the U.S. will almost certainly remove Jackson-Vanik after Russian WTO 
accession. 
 
The WTO requires that permanent MFN status be granted to all members. Thus, 
the provisions of Jackson-Vanik are inconsistent with MFN treatment required by the 
WTO. The U.S. has two options once Russia becomes a member of the WTO: (1) 
eliminate Jackson-Vanik; or (2) invoke the "non-application principle" of the WTO. For 
newly acceding countries, a member of the WTO can opt out of WTO commitments with 
respect to the newly acceding country if it invokes the “non-application” principle. If the 
U.S. were to invoke the non-application principle against Russia, it means that the U.S. 
would refuse to honor its WTO obligations to Russia. But non-application is reciprocal.  
So the U.S. would not have any assurance that its exporters or investors would be treated 
in Russia according to Russia's WTO commitments.  
 
In practice, the U.S. has dropped Jackson-Vanik on all countries that have 
acceded to the WTO with one exception. In the cases of Albania, Bulgaria Cambodia, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Jackson-Vanik was repealed prior to accession. In the 
cases of Mongolia, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan it was repealed after accession, so the 
"non-application" principle was invoked, but eventually removed within a year or two. 
(In the case of Georgia, non-application was never invoked since Jackson-Vanik was 
removed soon enough after accession.) Only in the case of Moldova does Jackson-Vanik 
still apply to a country that acceded to the WTO. 
 
Former U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman testified before Congress in 2006 
that the U.S. will have to lift Jackson-Vanik against Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in 
order for the U.S. exporters and investors to gain the advantages of the commitments 
these countries are making at the WTO. In the case of Ukraine, Jackson-Vanik was 
removed in 2006. 
 
VI. Remaining Issues 
  11 
  Often the most difficult issues remain at the end of the accession negotiations. 
Although Russia has resolved some of the most contentious, (such as gas pricing and 
branch banking where Russia achieved its objectives in the negotiations) several difficult 
issues remain.  
 
Georgia--The Customs Posts Issue with Russia 
 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are two breakaway regions of Georgia that have borders 
with Russia. Georgia insists that Russia close down two checkpoints between these 
regions and Russia, and that Russia establish legal customs posts. Georgia believes that a 
great deal of smuggling is coming from the breakaway regions through the illegal 
checkpoints and this is helping the breakaway regions to survive. 
 
Russia has banned the import of wines from Georgia, which appears to many Georgian 
officials as retaliation for the pressure Georgia had placed on Russia in the WTO 
accession negotiations. Georgia, which has signed its bilateral agreement on Russian 
WTO Accession in 2004, then withdrew its support for Russia’s WTO accession. 
Moreover, Georgia has objected to the agenda of the multilateral meetings and thereby 
blocked any meetings of the Working Party on Russian WTO accession. It is very 
difficult for Russia to resolve the multilateral issues without multilateral meetings.   
 
Article XII of the WTO Articles on Accession states that   
“Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference 
shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the 
WTO.”  
 
Based on the two-thirds majority rule on accession in Article XII, Russia has apparently 
investigated whether it can by-pass Georgia based on this two-thirds majority rule 
pertaining to accessions. As a practical matter, the two-thirds majority rule is an illusion 
and all accession decisions are taken by consensus (by unanimity) as are all other 
decisions of the WTO (except dispute settlement). The Working Party would have to 
write a final report on Russia’s WTO accession, without which the matter of Russia’s 
WTO accession will never come to a vote before the WTO Ministerial Meeting. Just as 
Georgia has been able to block the Working Party from meeting, Georgia will be able to 
block the report from going to the Ministerial. So again, consensus is required and 
Georgia has a blocking vote.  This implies that sooner or later Russia will have to 
negotiate seriously with Georgia, something that Georgian officials have complained has 




  I have discussed this issue above so only briefly discuss it here. Russia failed in 
the bilateral discussions to achieve its objective of defining 1992-1994 as the base period 
for trade-distorting agricultural subsidies. Russia now hopes that it will be able to 
negotiate a dollar amount that it would be allowed to subsidize. This is likely to be a very 
difficult negotiation as there are other countries, like Kazakhstan and Ukraine, who 
  12would like similar departures from precedent. If the Working Party allows Russia a larger 
trade-distorting subsidy amount, it will have a more difficult time negotiating previous 
limits with subsequent applicants for WTO membership. Australia and New Zealand are 





  In general, the Working Party believes that Russian laws on intellectual property 
are consistent with international obligations. The problem is in enforcement. In February, 
U.S. private industry sources complained that Russia was not cracking down on pirated 
copies of goods, including software, music, films and pharmaceuticals. As part of its 
bilateral agreement with the U.S., Russia signed a “side letter” in which it agreed to take 
several steps to strengthen enforcement of its intellectual property regime.  Private U.S. 
industry sources also complain about the failure of Russia to close websites, like 
allofmp3.com, that sell material that is protected by copyright, and more generally that 
Russia is not complying with the terms of its side-letter with the U.S. on intellectual 
property rights.  
. 
Issues with the European Union 
 
There are several trade issues between the EU and Russia in the spring of 2007.  
Although there have been some press reports that allege that the EU is considering 
blocking Russian WTO accession due to these problems,
 14 officially EU officials have 
not changed their support for Russian WTO accession.  
 
Estonia relocated a Soviet war memorial in its capital of Tallinn. This led to 
demonstrations at the Estonian embassy in Moscow, and a complaint from NATO that 
Russia did not protect Estonian embassy staff. This was complemented by a cut off by 
Russia of oil and coal exports to Estonia. Other issues are the Russian ban on all meat 
imports from Poland. The EU regards the penalty as disproportionate to the offense of 
some falsified documents on selected shipments of meat exports from Poland. The EU is 
also concerned about proposed export taxes on wood exports from Russia and dual 
pricing for international and domestic rail cargo. On the plus side, one of the more 
contentious issues, the timing of the elimination of overflight fees for aircraft over 
Russian skies has been resolved in 2007.   
 
When Will Russia Achieve Membership? 
 
  The multilateral talks are focused on the details of how and when Russia will take 
on the multilateral obligations of a WTO member. Many of the most difficult issues 
remain to the end of the process and thus some of the most difficult compromises are 
necessary. Some observers are suggesting that more isolationist interests in Russia have 
gained more influence and thus Russia is having second thoughts about an open economy 
                                                 
14 For further details see “EU Threatens Russian Trade Bar,” May 5, 2007. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/05/04/wrussia04.xml 
  13model of economic development. If correct, this would make it very difficult then to 
come to a final agreement.  
 
Gemain Gref, the Russian minister of economic development and trade, has 
forecast that Russia should be able to accede to the WTO by the end of 2007.  On the 
other hand, the disputes with the EU have reportedly led some EU officials to express 
reservations about EU support for Russian unless the problems are resolved. And on 
February 14, 2007, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab told the Senate Finance 
Committee that "Russia is not moving ahead with the kind of WTO commitments that it 
would need, at this point, to become a full-fledged member of the WTO.” Regarding the 
multilateral talks she added they "are not proceeding as well or as quickly as I think 
Russia had hoped."  
 
The difficulty of the issues above, and the stiffening of political will on many 
sides (as elaborated by Aslund 2007), suggests that 2007 is overly optimistic for Russian 
accession. It is difficult to believe, however, that a country as important as Russia will not 
become a member of the WTO. I am optimistic, therefore, that the West and Russia will 
eventually come to an agreement. And once Russia has an agreement with the West, 
Russia and Georgia will also resolve their dispute. 
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Table 1: Impact of WTO Accession on Economy-Wide Variables in Russia: Policy Results 































model      
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Aggregate welfare                 
Welfare (EV as % of consumption)    7.2  1.3  0.6 5.2  23.6 4.1  7.7  5.9 
Welfare (EV as % of GDP)    3.3  0.6  0.3 2.4  11.0 1.9  3.6  2.8 
                 
Government budget                 
Tariff revenue (% of GDP)  1.4  0.9  0.8  1.4 1.4 1.0  0.8  0.9  0.8 
Tariff revenue (% change)    -33.4  -38.4 8.4 10.6  -23.3  -35.4 -33.2 -35.8 
                 
Aggregate trade                 
Real exchange rate (% change)    2.6 2.0  -0.5  1.1  4.8  1.8  2.7 3.0 
Aggregate exports (% change)    13.2 7.9 1.5  3.5  24.3  10.8 13.5 9.5 
                
Returns to mobile factors                 
Unskilled Labor (% change)    2.5  0.4  0.1 1.9  13.2 1.0  2.7  1.9 
Skilled Labor (% change)    4.7  1.5  0.6 2.5  17.6 2.6  4.9  3.4 
Capital (% change)    4.9  2.0  0.7 3.1  19.5 3.6  4.9  4.3 
                 
Factor adjustments                 
Unskilled labor (% of non-sector 
specific workers who change jobs)    2.6  1.1  0.5 1.6 4.4  1.7  2.6  0.0 
Skilled labor (% of non-sector 
specific workers who change jobs)    2.1  0.4  0.4 1.5 2.5  1.0  2.2  0.0 
Capital   0.6  0.4  0.4  0.2 0.1  0.6  0.6  0.4 
                             
 
Source: Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr, Review of Development Economics, August 2007..
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Table 2 MFN Tariff rates of the Russian Federation 
(a) 
  
Mean  Standard Deviation 
Year  Tariff  Observations
Simple Trade 




























Actual MFN tariff 
rate  11.7  11.4  10.8  9.5  0  518  201 
Ad valorem rate 
only (b) 
11,076 
10.9  10.5  6.0  6.5  0  100 
Actual MFN tariff 
rate  12.2  13.3  13.7  14.9  0  483  2002 
Ad valorem rate 
only 
11,148 
10.8  11.2  6.0  8.0  0  100 
Actual MFN tariff 
rate  12.8  14.3  18.7  18.0  0  1270 2003 
Ad valorem rate 
only 
11,161 
10.9  10.3  6.9  6.8  0  100 
Actual MFN tariff 
rate  12.4  14.1  13.3  17.0  0  293  2004 
Ad valorem rate 
only 
11,218 
10.9  11.1  6.9  7.3  0  100 
Actual MFN tariff 
rate  12.1  14.0  12.7  15.2  0  470  2005 
Ad valorem rate 
only 
11,365 
10.8  11.2  7.0  7.8  0  100 
Notes:  (a) Table 1 presents summary statistics at the ten digit level          
  
(b) The ad valorem rate only calculations ignore specific tariffs, i.e, assume that specific 
tariffs are zero.    
Source: Shepotylo and Tarr (forthcoming). 
 
 